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Abstract 
Most policy and research interest regarding rural credit markets revolves around the 
perception that poor households in developing countries lack access to credit, which is 
believed to have negative consequences for household welfare. An important feature of the 
rural credit market is that access to credit is easier for some groups than for others. The 
Vietnamese government supplied credit on preferential terms, particularly to rural households, 
through state-owned financial intermediaries. The share of the informal sector was thus 
considerably reduced from 78% (1992/93) of all outstanding loans to 54% (1997/98) in favor 
of the formal sector. However, there is evidence from other developing countries that credit 
constraints persist despite the expansion of rural finance. Hulme and Mosley (1996) state that 
there is increasing evidence that the poorest 20% of the population are excluded from rural 
credit programs. Thus, even in Vietnam the question remains: did the Vietnamese government 
succeed in reaching the poor, or do groups of people exist who are still access-constrained? 
Quantitative (N=260) and qualitative data collection took place between March 2000 and 
2001. The quantitative data comprise cross-sectional household-level data from two different 
districts in Northern Vietnam. The poverty outreach of formal rural lenders was analyzed 
using Principal Component Analysis, while access to formal credit was investigated using a 
binary logit analysis. The poverty outreach of the formal lenders is quite satisfactory since 
about 50% of all predominantly poor rural households have access to formal credit. However, 
the poorest households are seldom clients of formal lenders. Yet, it is not their extreme 
general poverty that determines their access to formal credit. The results indicate that only 
certain aspects of poverty, e.g. low quality of housing, have an important influence on access 
to formal credit in Vietnam. The poorest households simply have much less demand for 
formal credit. Offering new credit products would only slightly improve the credit coverage 
of poorer households. More promising would be a specialized pro-poor extension service to 
widen the scope of their investment ideas and possibilities, combined with general 
improvement of the infrastructure. All in all, the most appropriate tool to incorporate poorer 
households into the formal financial system would be mobilization of savings. Nevertheless, 
the number of access-constrained households is surprisingly low. One reason for the low 
number is the weakening or eradication of former access constraints. Some access barriers do 
still exist, e.g. towards ethnic minorities or female-led households. To reduce these access 
barriers, the actions to be taken should be catering to the specific needs and the circumstances 
of those households that lack access.  
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Outreach of credit institutes and households' access constraints to formal 
credit in Northern Vietnam 
Thomas Dufhues, Gertrud Buchenrieder 
1 Introduction1 
Most policy and research interest regarding rural credit markets revolves around the 
perception that poor households in developing countries lack adequate access to credit, which 
is believed to have significant negative consequences for various household-level outcomes. 
During the past 40 years, most developing countries and donors have set up credit programs 
aiming at improving rural households’ access to credit. The vast majority of these programs, 
especially the so-called ‘agricultural development banks’, have failed both to achieve their 
objectives to serve the poor and to be financially sustainable institutions. An important feature 
of the rural credit market is that access to credit is far easier for some groups than for others. 
Meanwhile, most rural households in developing countries continue to rely on the informal 
market for their inter-temporal transfer of resources. Therefore, outreach of the financial 
institution and access to financial services have become a major issue in microfinance, and 
particularly in rural finance (Diagne et al. 2000, Sarap 1990).2 
Formal rural credit is considered by Vietnamese government agencies to be a powerful tool 
for poverty reduction (Sida-MARD 1998). During the early 1990s, informal credit accounted 
for almost 80% of total outstanding loans in Vietnam (GSO 1995). The Vietnamese 
government tried to break the dominance of the informal sector and push development by 
supplying credit on preferential terms, particularly to rural households. The preferential credit 
was delivered mainly by state-owned financial intermediaries such as the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) and the 
People’s Credit Funds (PCFs).3 In addition, the State Treasury implemented special sector 
                                                 
1 The research for this paper was carried out within the framework of the German-Thai-Vietnamese 
Collaborative Research Program ‘Sustainable Land Use and Rural Development in Mountainous Regions of 
Southeast Asia’ also known as Uplands Program. The funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(DFG) and the co-funding from the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment of Vietnam is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2 The performance of financial intermediaries in terms of breadth and depth of poverty outreach is partly a 
function of a range of internal factors such as the type of services provided, the use of screening methods to 
identify the poor, the financial scope of the program, and the marketing strategy of the program (Zeller et al. 
2003). Although there are more dimensions than depth and breadth of outreach (for a detailed overview see 
Navajas et al. (2000) and Schreiner (2002)), this research will focus mainly on depth and breadth of outreach. 
Since society places more weight on the poor than on the rich, poverty is a good proxy for depth (Navajas et al. 
2000). The poorer the clients reached by the financial institute, the deeper the outreach (Zeller et al. 2003). 
3 On March 11, 2003, the VBP and the PCFs were replaced by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) 
(Vietnam Economy 2003, World Bank 2003). 
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credit programs, e.g. the 120 Program to promote employment (Dufhues et al. 2004a). Initial 
signs of success of formal credit outreach were reported by the Vietnamese Living Standard 
Surveys, which stated that the share of the informal sector had been considerably reduced 
from 78% (1992/93) of all outstanding loans to 54% (1997/98) in favor to the formal sector 
(GSO 1995, GSO 2000). There is evidence from other developing countries that credit 
constraints persist despite the expansion of microfinance. For instance, Amin et al. (2003) 
find that microfinance institutes (MFIs) in Bangladesh do not really reach those who are 
credit-constrained. Recent research suggest that, in Vietnam, the success of pro-poor policies 
will depend on easing structural constraints such as access to credit (Glewwe et al. 2002, 
Livingstone 2000). However, deeper outreach usually increases not only social value but also 
social cost. As income and wealth decrease, it becomes more costly to a lender to judge the 
risk of a loan. This happens because, compared with the rich, the poor are more 
heterogeneous and less able to signal their ability and willingness to repay (Conning 1999). 
Moreover, the provision of income-generating credit leads to a bias in favor of the less poor, 
because they have better opportunities to use the loan profitably (Hulme and Mosley 1996). 
While modern microcredit programs are definitely more successful at reaching the poor than 
their predecessors, they are less successful at reaching the vulnerable poor.4 Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) state that there is increasing evidence that the poorest 20% of the population 
are effectively excluded from microcredit programs.  
While the Vietnamese government has so far failed to create sustainable rural financial 
institutions, it has succeeded in providing a huge share of the population with formal credit. 
However, despite the immense formal outreach, the distribution of formal credit in the 
northern provinces of Vietnam is very heterogeneous. In some villages, over 90% of 
households are served by formal credit, while in others just a few or none at all (Dufhues et al. 
2002). The question thus remains: did the Vietnamese Government succeed in reaching the 
poor, or do groups of people still exist who are access-constrained? 
The second section describes the conceptual framework, the analytical methods used and the 
sample composition. Section two starts with a discussion of collateral use in Vietnam and 
then continues with a description of the effective credit demand of the sample households. 
The last two chapters of this section discuss the outreach of rural lenders and access to formal 
                                                 
4 Even with the use of group lending schemes, which are believed to have a good poverty outreach, the evidence 
suggests that the poorest people are excluded (Montgomery 1996). 
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loans by the households in this sample. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for 
improving outreach to access-constrained households.  
2 Methodology and data 
The following section describes the conceptual framework, followed by a description of the 
methodology used for the data analysis. Finally, the sample composition is presented.  
2.1 Access constraints to formal rural credit - the conceptual framework 
While the term outreach refers to the perspective of the financial intermediary and access 
refers to the point of view of the household, they both relate to the same thing: who is getting 
the credit (Vaessen 2001). Access constraints at the household level are mostly related to a 
lack of collateral (physical, human and/or social capital).5 The capital endowment of a 
household is of enormous importance for the household’s access to formal credit and to the 
outreach of rural lenders. Capital can be classified into three different categories, physical, 
human and social capital. The term physical capital refers to any non-human, infrastructural, 
financial, or natural asset needed to support livelihoods. Human capital represents the skills, 
knowledge, ability to labor and good health of individuals or households. Social capital is 
defined here according to Coleman (1999), who states that social capital is not a single entity 
but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some 
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the 
structure. The characteristics of human and social capital are identified as ‘capital’ in order to 
underline the need for continuous investment and to emphasize the importance of these 
factors in generating future income, particularly for the poor.  
Figure 1 shows the different kinds of capital/collateral. Different kinds of capital/collateral 
can substitute each other, but only to a certain degree. Nevertheless, the capital endowment of 
a household represents the basis for the collateral used by the lender. Informal lenders, for 
instance, in the absence of physical collateral, have always used human and social collateral. 
Formal lenders usually rely on physical collateral that can be easily sold, are not moveable, 
are of sizeable value, and ideally carry a legal title, such as land and buildings.6  
                                                 
5 Access constraints can also be intermediary-based, in other words influenced for example by business policies 
or staff attitudes, hard and soft skills. A conceptual framework of client-related barriers versus program-related 
barriers is presented in Evans et al. (1999) and Vaessen (2001). However, this analysis focuses on the household 
level and rather neglects intermediary-based issues as they are reflected in the households’ access constraints. 
6 Physical collateral has several functions, e.g. signaling credit worthiness. However its two main functions are:  
First, it insures the lenders’ loan portfolio in case of default by borrowers. Second, it represents an incentive, 
enhancing the borrower’s willingness to repay his loan (Bester 1987, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework - the capital-collateral system  
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Physical capital and collateral: Collateral in the form of physical capital plays a key role in 
lending practices. It shifts a portion of the potential capital loss from the lender to the 
borrower (Binswanger and Sillers 1983). Lending institutions typically resort to legal options, 
such as seizing the property of the borrower or garnishing wages directly from the employer 
to enforce contracts. Regardless of the actual value of the asset owned by the borrower, the 
act of pledging assets and the consequent realization that they can be lost causes the client to 
repay the loan if possible (Ledgerwood 1999). Even if the collateral is almost never collected, 
this does not signal its lack of importance as an incentive device. If the threat is believable, 
there should be few instances when collateral is actually collected (Morduch 1999). 
Nevertheless, in most poor communities, such punishment fails for one of the two reasons: 
either the legal infrastructure does not support such action, or the borrower has no sizeable 
assets or wages (Karlan 2001).7 This is a particular problem of MFIs, which systematically 
lend to low-income clients who usually have very few marketable assets. Traditional 
collateral such as property, land/land use certificates, or other capital assets is often not 
available. Therefore, the absence of physical capital, and thus collateral, has for a long time 
been seen as the major access constraint of lower-income households. 
                                                 
7 For instance, in socialist economies like China, land is collectively owned, preventing its use as collateral (Park 
and Ren 2001). 
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Human capital and collateral: At the household level, human capital is a factor of the 
amount and quality of available labor, which usually is defined in terms of the health and 
education levels of individuals. Lack of human capital is seen as an access constraint from the 
household side, as there is often a need to fill in application forms or draw up small business 
plans, and this requires a certain amount of human capital (see for instance Panjaitan-
Drioadisuryo and Cloud (1999)). Human capital can compensate for a lack of physical 
collateral. Then, the decision of whether or not to grant the credit is based mainly on the 
profitability of the investment. However, this practice is still very uncommon among rural 
lenders. Usually staff lacks the appropriate skills to assess an investment reliably.  
Social capital and collateral: The poor seldom have physical collateral to offer. The most 
common way to deal with this problem is by using social collateral. Here, the borrowers’ 
reputation, or the social (and political) networks to which they belong, replace traditional 
physical collateral (Bastelaer van 2003, Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud 1999). Usually this 
results in applying credit group schemes with joint liability.8 Under an individual lending 
contract, if the borrower defaults, all he has to fear is the penalties the bank can impose, 
which, in the absence of collateral, simply means the denial of future loans. In group lending, 
he may also be exposed to the wrath of other group members (Besley and Coate 1995).  
Infrastructure: The rural infrastructure influences both access to and outreach of credit 
equally, and is therefore not depicted in Figure 1. Infrastructure not only refers to the ‘hard’ 
infrastructure, like roads, but also to ‘soft’ infrastructure, such as legal frameworks. For 
instance, Fabbri and Padula (2003) found in a recent paper that lax legal enforcement 
increases the probability of poor people being access-constrained to formal credit in Italy.  
2.2 Measuring outreach and access: econometric models 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA):9 The breadth of outreach of a microfinance institution 
is easy to measure (one simply counts the clients), but other dimensions of outreach, 
particularly poverty outreach, are more difficult to measure (Woller et al. 1999). A poverty 
assessment tool was developed in the late 1990s by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), which uses the PCA as econometric instrument. The objective was to design 
                                                 
8 Despite its popularity, group lending-oriented microfinance is not a panacea for solving all problems of access 
to financial services for the poor in developing countries. Not only specialized agricultural development banks 
are prone to the difficulties due to information asymmetries and moral hazard pointed out by institution 
economics; these problems can also occur in group lending. For a critical view of group lending see, e.g., 
Heidhues et al. (1997) and Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994). 
9 The next section is based on a review by Häuser et al. (2005). 
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a tool to assess the poverty level of the clients of a microfinance institution in relation to their 
non-clients (who represent the general population in its area of operation) to give a reliable 
assessment of the poverty outreach of the institution (Zeller et al. 2001, Zeller et al. 2005). 
The PCA is a multivariate technique and its main objective is to reduce the dimension of the 
observations (Härdle and Simar 2003). Different correlated variables are aggregated into 
fewer uncorrelated principal components, which can be seen as indices. With this technique, 
most of the information contained in the data is represented in the new indices. The analysis 
can be viewed as a ‘data reduction technique’, since the set of original m variables is reduced 
to n principal components (PC), with n«m. This smaller number of components can then be 
used for interpretation purposes or for further data analysis. The procedure carried out by the 
analysis is to calculate new uncorrelated principal components by linear combinations of the 
original, correlated variables. This is done by deriving (standardized) weights for each 
indicator. In algebraic terms this means that: 
PC1 = w11 v1 + w12  v2 + … + w1m vm 
PC2 = w21 v1 + w22  v2 + … + w2m vm 
PCm = wm1 v1 + wm2 v2 + … + wmm vm 
With: w = calculated weight 
 v = variable 
Applied to poverty assessment, the PCA determines a subset of indicators that measure the 
relative poverty level of a household. In the end, a single indicator for each household is 
created that reflects the household’s poverty status in relation to all other households of the 
sample (Zeller et al. 2005). With the weights of the PC1 and the respective indicators, the 
poverty index is calculated for each household. Relative comparisons can then be drawn by 
ordering the households according to their poverty index. In this way, it is possible to identify 
which households are better or worse off than others. By creating terciles, quartiles or 
quintiles using the index, different wealth groups can be derived. The most important 
advantage of the PCA is that on the one hand it creates a single indicator that is easy to use for 
analysis, while at the same time this single indicator is not limited to the monetary aspect 
addressed by household expenditures as the conventional method of (income) poverty. The 
PCA technique allows to take the multiple dimensions of poverty into account and to integrate 
qualitative with quantitative variables. Therefore, indicators capturing different dimensions 
are included that measure changing conditions at different levels of welfare. These indicators 
can be categorized into three groups (Henry et al. 2003): 
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1. Means to achieve welfare 
This category includes indicators that reflect the earning capacities of a household. 
They are subdivided into human capital, social capital and ownership of assets. 
2. Basic needs 
These indicators show the fulfillment of basic needs, such as health status, food, 
shelter and clothing, partly obtained by questions asking the respondent about his or 
her self-assessment of the situation. 
3. Other aspects of welfare 
Security, self-assessment of (subjective) poverty, social status and the environment are 
captured in this group.10 
Binary logit analysis: This research collects household-level credit market information to 
determine whether or not households are constrained as regards access to formal credit. 
Whether or not a household is access-constrained is depicted in the decision tree of effective 
credit demand (see Figure 9 in the Annex). Households that had access to formal credit were 
considered not to be access-constrained regardless of whether or not they originally wanted to 
borrow more than they were lent. In particular, non-borrowing households were asked their 
reasons for not borrowing or for having been rejected. Diagne et al. (2000) and Zeller and 
Sharma (2000) state that households may have chosen not to borrow even when they had 
access to credit, while others may have wanted to borrow, but had no access. For these 
reasons, one cannot equate observed demand with access. Finally, the sample households 
were classified into households with and without access to formal credit.  
Regression models describe the relationship between a dependent variable and independent 
explanatory variables (Backhaus et al. 1996). Ordinary least square regression models 
consider the dependent variable to be continuous in nature, while the explanatory variables 
can be either continuous or categorical. But it is not uncommon that a dependent variable is 
binary in nature, i.e., that it can only have two possible values, one for the occurrence of an 
event, zero otherwise. In this case, the dependent (binary) variable is one for all households 
with access to formal credit and zero otherwise. A mixture of continuous and categorical 
variables may explain this dependent binary variable. Therefore, the econometric model used 
in this research work is a binary logit regression. In the binary logit regression model, the 
                                                 
10 The adapted list of poverty indicators used in this research work can be found in Figure 10 the Annex.  
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predicted probabilities for the dependent variable will never be less than (or equal to) zero, or 
greater than (or equal to) one, regardless of the values of the independent variables.  
The explanatory variables for the binary logit model and the hypotheses behind the choice of 
the explanatory variables are presented in Table 1. Descriptive statistics of these variables can 
be found in Table 7 in the Annex. As the variables have different units of measurement, the 
independent variables were standardized using z-transformation to make them comparable. In 
accordance with the theoretical framework, the variables have been sorted according to their 
character as indicators for the different forms of capital/collateral (see Section 2.1). 
 
Table 1 Variables for the binary logistic regression model on credit access  
Physical capital-related variables 
1. Red or Green Books* 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Red Books or Green Books, certifying a person’s use rights to farmland and 
forests, are often demanded as collateral by rural lenders in Vietnam (Dufhues et 
al. 2004a). It is assumed that possession of a Red or Green Book will positively 
influence access to formal credit. 
2. Agricultural land 
(m2) 
Land is an important form of collateral. However, most property rights relating 
to land have an informal character in developing countries. In the absence of Red 
Books, Vietnamese farmers can apply to the local People’s Committees for 
special land use certificates. Only 8% of the loans were used wholly or partly for 
buying land. Hence, the endogeneity of the variable is negligible. 
3. Value of houses  
(VND) 
Houses can be used as formal collateral with a max. value of five million VND. 
Thus, this variable is assumed to positively influence access to credit. Only 4% 
of the loans were invested complete or partly into constructing houses. Hence, 
the endogeneity of the variable is negligible.  
4. Government salary 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Government salaries can serve as collateral (Dufhues et al. 2004a) and may 
therefore improve access to credit. Furthermore, government work in particular 
allows individuals to enhance their social network, helping them to stay 
informed about economic developments and new laws or policies (Alther et al. 
2002, Dufhues et al. 2002), which may also facilitate access to credit. 
5. Cash savings 
(VND) 
In theory, savings can be used as collateral, too. However, nearly 100% of the 
savings in this survey are informal and cannot therefore easily be seized by a 
formal lender. Nevertheless, savings are the basis for accumulating physical 
capital and are therefore a good indicator of possession of physical capital. In 
addition, they are a good indicator for the repayment capacity of households and 
are therefore assumed to have a positive influence on access to credit. 
Human capital-related variables 
6. School years of HH 
head 
(years) 
Better education is assumed to improve access to credit as loan application 
procedures demand a certain degree of formal education. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to expect that better educated households perform better in their 
investment activities. This was also shown in a recent paper by van de Walle 
(2003), who found that marginal benefit of irrigation increased strongly with the 
education of the household. Thus, better educated households are usually 
perceived as more creditworthy.  
7. Vietnamese 
communication skills 
of the married couple
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Vietnamese is the official language and used for the credit application procedure. 
The household head and his wife have to sign the credit contract. Therefore, it is 
assumed that households in which one of the two lacks the necessary language 
skills are more often access-constrained (in the event of only husband or wife 
existing in the household, his/her language capability is taken into account).  
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8. Receiving 
agricultural 
extension service 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Households who receive agricultural extension services are likely to gain better 
access to improved knowledge and are thus able to increase their human capital. 
But at the same time, households who do not receive agricultural extension are 
likely to have fallen through the village information network and are assumed to 
have a low social capital base. 
9. Active HH members  
(number) 
Household members between 15 and 60 years for male members and 15 and 55 
for female persons were counted as one workforce. These age lines represent the 
official retirement age in Vietnam. This indicator evaluates the labor capacity of 
the household and indicates human capital in the sense of labor force. Each 
investment activity demands additional labor. Households with a lower labor 
supply are assumed to have less access to formal credit.  
10. Share of non-farm 
activities in total 
yearly income  
(%) 
A high share of non-farm activity in total income may indicate a shift from 
traditional farm activities towards more innovative non-farm investments. It also 
includes households with employment at government agencies, which demands a 
certain level of education and entrepreneurial skill. Therefore, it is assumed that 
households with a higher share of non-farm income also have a higher level of 
human capital. Income from day labor is excluded, as this does not require any 
human capital except for the labor itself.  
11. Lost working days 
due to illness 
(days/year/HH) 
The number of lost working days per year within a household due to illness is a 
good indicator of the quality of human capital. The larger the number, the lower 
the human capital. It is assumed that households with a weaker human capital 
base are more often access-constrained. 
Social capital-related variables 
12. Giving help 
(days/year/HH) 
13. Receiving help 
(days/year/HH) 
Receiving and giving help to friends and relatives is seen as an important 
indicator of social activity and of being a member of a social network, and thus 
of social capital, and this will positively influence the probability of having 
access to credit as households are better protected against income shocks. 
14. Interest-free informal 
credit 
(VND) 
Small interest-free informal loans are not a substitute for formal loans (Section 
3.2). Thus, borrowing from informal sources is usually not the result of an access 
constraint to the formal financial market. Possession of an informal interest-free 
loan is a good indicator of a functioning informal social network. However, it is 
also seen as a mechanism for coping with sudden shocks and it suggests that the 
household may have a lower repaying capacity and a low physical capital 
endowment. Thus, the a priori sign of the coefficient is ambiguous.  
15. Thai/Tay village 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Considered them from a national point of view, the Thai and Tay ethnic groups 
are ethnic minorities. However, in the two research regions, Ba Be and Yen 
Chau district, the Tay and Thai are the ethnic majority. For instance, official 
positions in Ba Be are usually occupied by members of Tay ethnicity (Dufhues et 
al. 2002). Belonging to one of these ethnicities is seen as important social 
capital. Besides, anecdotal evidence suggests that there exists a constraining 
hierarchy among the ethnic groups in Northern Vietnam. For example in Ba Be, 
Tay and Kinh are the leading ethnic groups, followed by the Nung, Dao, or 
Hmong (Alther et al. 2002, Castella et al. 2002). Villages in the research region 
are of high ethnic homogeneity (see Table 2). Ethnic Thai or Tay usually dwell 
in valley positions or at medium-high altitudes with very similar agricultural 
production systems. Households not belonging to the regional ethnic majority 
but dwelling in a village mainly populated by them are also assumed to profit 
from this location. Therefore, household observations within a Tay/Thai village 
are not necessarily independent. However, significant differences can be 
expected between Tay/Thai villages and villages of other ethnic groups that are 
not captured by our data (e.g. different production systems). Therefore, 
households are grouped by Tay/Thai village to account for those differences.  It 
is assumed that households dwelling in a Thai or Tay village are more privileged 
and therefore have better access to credit. Village fixed effects which are related 
to natural conditions (e.g. climate) are not viewed as relevant for access to credit 
in Northern Vietnam. An attempt is made to control for socio-economic village 
fixed effects, e.g. market access, by different variables, such as number of 
market visits.  
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16. Only female HH 
members going to 
the market 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Who goes to the market is regarded as important factor for gaining access to 
certain social networks and for gathering essential credit information. 
Particularly when only women go to the market, the household as a whole may 
be excluded from important information. But this might also be an indicator of a 
weak human capital base, as the male household head could be dead, have left 
the family, or be physically or mentally incapable of going to the market. Hence, 
it is assumed that when only female household members go to the market, the 
chance of being access-constrained is higher. 
17. Age of the household 
(years) 
This variable can go in two directions. On the one hand, it may be that the older 
the household, the wider and stronger the social network of the household 
members and thus, the greater its political influence and its ability to gather 
credit-relevant information. On the other hand, however, younger households 
may be better educated or more dynamic. Thus, the a priori sign of the 
coefficient is ambiguous. 
Infrastructure-related variables 
18. Remoteness 
(km) 
This variable measures the distance in kilometers of rural households from the 
district center where formal bank branches are located. Hung and Giap (1999) 
state that the distance to the nearest bank branch strongly influences access. 
19. Market visits per 
month 
(numbers) 
The frequency of market visits by household members is assumed to be an 
indicator of high social activity. Frequent market visits may also increase the 
chance of receiving essential credit information, e.g. on the availability of loans 
(Dufhues et al. 2002). The frequency of market visits of course also depends on 
the infrastructure connection and the remoteness of the household’s dwelling. 
20. Different markets 
visited 
(numbers)  
The number of different markets visited is an indicator of the breadth of a 
household’s information networks. It is assumed that the broader the network, 
the more relevant information is available to the household for receiving a credit. 
The number of markets visited also depends on the infrastructure connection and 
the remoteness of the household’s dwelling. 
Poverty-related variables** 
21. Poverty index  Anecdotal evidence suggests that even credits that are targeted at the poor seem 
to be bypassing the poorest groups (Neefjes 2001, World Bank and DFID 1999). 
Thus, poorer households are assumed to have less access to formal loans. 
22. Supply of day labor 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Poor agricultural laborers and other day-laborer (for instance in road 
construction) are assumed to be more often access-constrained due to their low 
social standing (Fallavier 1994). Nevertheless, this may be also an indicator of 
lack of agricultural land and thus of physical capital. 
23. Receiving aid from 
government 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Only very poor or very vulnerable households receive food/equipment aid from 
the government. It is thus assumed that these households have less access to 
formal credit. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not always the 
people with the greatest need who receive the help, but those who also have good 
contacts with village authorities, pointing to a certain degree of social capital, so 
the a priori sign of the coefficient is ambiguous. 
Note: *Land is owned by the state in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the government allocates land use 
certificates to farm households, the so-called ‘Red Books’ for agricultural land (valid for 20 years) 
and, ‘Green Books’ (valid for 30-50 years) for forest land. Farmers are allowed to sell or rent land 
use certificates, or pass them on to children (Luibrand 2002). 
 **Poverty usually refers to a lack of human, social, and physical capital. Therefore, some variables 
that indicate a lack of a mixture of the different forms of capital partly capture the influence of 
poverty on access to formal credit.  
 HH = household 
 
2.3 Regional focus and sampling procedures 
Data collection took place from March 2001 to March 2002. Detailed financial market data 
were collected at the household level, including information on household, farm, and business 
activities, assets, savings and borrowing transactions with both formal and informal sources, 
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and households’ perceptions of their formal sector borrowing opportunities. The survey also 
documented household consumption and labor market participation. 
Two research sites were selected, namely Bac Kan province (Ba Be district) and Son La 
province (Yen Chau district). Both provinces are located in the mountainous regions of 
Northern Vietnam and are among the poorest provinces of the country (World Bank 1999). 
Ba Be district is a very remote area and has only recently (in 1999/2000) gained access to 
regional and interregional markets. Farmers produce mainly for subsistence and a large 
proportion of them may be considered poor. Due to the creation of the Ba Be National Park 
(close to Ba Be town), huge resettlements took place, aggravating the socio-economic 
problems in the region. The Yen Chau district has a much better connection to regional 
markets (Son La town) and even to greater Hanoi, and therefore offers a good contrast to the 
situation in Ba Be district.  
 
Table 2 Research areas and sample composition 
Selected households Province and 
district 
Commune Village Main ethnic 
minority 
Number of 
households 
per village 
 
Number % 
Dia Linh Pac Nghe 1 Tay (97%) 76  36 47 
Nghien Loan Khau Nen Nung (89%) 36  19 53 
Province 
Ba Kan,  
district 
Ba Be 
Xuan La Thom Meo 
Khuoi Khi 
Tay (93%) 
Dao (100%) 
84 
40 
 43 
20 
51 
50 
Sap Vat Sai 
Na Pa 
Dong 
Thai (85%) 
Thai (100%) 
Thai (100%) 
80 
64 
48 
 42 
33 
25 
53 
52 
52 
Province 
Son La,  
district 
Yen Chau Chieng Hac Bo Kieng Hmong (100%) 20  13 65 
 Chieng Pan Than  
Tat Heo 
Kho Mu (100%) 
Thai (100%) 
38 
16 
 20 
9 
53 
56 
Interviewed households in total:  260  
Source: Own data 
 
The communes and villages were stratified in accordance with pre-defined selection criteria to 
ensure a good degree of variance in the sample. These criteria are:  
• being located at different altitudes (valley, middle slope and top position), to obtain 
different stages of market access, ecological zones and ethnic minorities,  
• being engaged in different phases of the land allocation process (land allocation 
completed or not completed, percentage of households with land use certificates), and  
• having different shares of households with non-farm activities. 
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An overview of the sample in both regions is given in Table 2. Half of all households in each 
village were randomly selected after being stratified according to their living standard into 
five categories using official poverty data from the village headmen.11 
3 Outreach of and access to formal rural lenders in Vietnam  
The following section first discusses the general use of collateral by formal lenders in 
Northern Vietnam. The situation as regards effective credit demand is then presented in 
Section 3.2, followed by the outreach of rural lenders (Section 3.3) and econometric analysis 
of access-constrained households (Section 3.4). 
3.1  Collateral use  
The main collateral demanded by lenders in Vietnam is physical collateral in the form of land 
use certificates (Red and Green Books). Social collateral in the form of references is also a 
widespread requirement, particularly in Northern Vietnam, and both forms are often 
intermingled.12  
In Vietnam, lenders face enormous difficulty in enforcing pledges and mortgages (Riedel 
2000, UNDP 1999). Banks are not usually allowed to seize land from defaulting farmers, 
even if the use rights have been pledged. It is more or less impossible to evict farmers and 
auction their land because of the lack of legal infrastructure and resistance from local 
authorities (Wolz 1997). Only a few cases exist where land has been liquidated in the event of 
a farmer’s collapse (Duong and Izumida 2002). It appears that the underdeveloped legal 
framework does not prove effective for the use of physical collateral as a risk management 
tool (Gottwald and Klump 1999). Nevertheless, the VBARD still insists on land use 
certificates as collateral and relies mainly on the psychological pressure related to the 
possibility of losing land.
13
 As the liquidation of collateral is almost impossible in practice 
(although this may not be known to the farmers), rescheduling of the loan is often the only 
possibility for the credit officer to avoid designating a loan as overdue, not performing, or 
lost. Therefore, rescheduling of loans in VBARD/VBP is extremely high (Izumida and Duong 
2001, VBARD and Danida 1999). According to Binswanger and Sillers (1983), farmers, and 
                                                 
11 The Vietnamese government classifies every household once a year according to its living standard into one of 
five categories: hungry, poor, medium, better-off, and rich (Dufhues et al. (2002) and Geppert and Dufhues 
(2003)). 
12 A detailed description of the use of different kinds of physical collateral in the credit procedures of rural 
lenders in Vietnam can be found in Dufhues et al. (2004a). 
13 In contrast to VBARD practice, the government and VBARD headquarters state that households can take out 
loans of less than ten million VND without any collateral (see VBARD (2001)). 
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particularly poor farmers, in developing countries are almost universally risk-averse and often 
reluctant to put their assets at stake as collateral for a loan. However, as Dufhues et al. 
(2004a) found, even poor farmers in Northern Vietnam are not afraid to pledge their land use 
certificates as collateral. They may be convinced that their investment will not fail or, more 
likely, they believe that the bank will not seize the land even if they have difficulty repaying 
their loan. 
Officially, the VBP uses solely group lending schemes with joint liability for delivering its 
loans (VBP 1999).14 Anecdotal evidence, however, revealed that in some cases of so-called 
‘hungry’ households, which are officially excluded from access to VBP loans as they are 
considered too poor, the credit officers insist on collateral in the form of land use certificates, 
too. In this sample, over 25% of all VBP credits (N=94) were secured by physical collateral in 
various forms. The so-called joint liability credit groups are not working effectively, as some 
of the regulations enforced by the VBP seem to neutralize the peer pressure that is important 
for good credit repayment records. In everyday practice, the group members are not held 
liable for each other; the person who fails to repay the loan is simply expelled from the group 
and no negative consequences are imposed on the other group members. As joint liability 
does not work in the case of VBP, and physical collateral fails to achieve its intended purpose 
in the case of VBARD, both require guarantees from local authorities in the form of 
‘certificates of good conduct’ and they rely on an extensive network of non-bank local 
officials, who support the banks in screening, monitoring, and enforcing the loans (Dufhues et 
al. 2002). However, supervision of these structures can be difficult. For instance, Todd (1996) 
reported that when a loan officer who was at the same time president of the local political 
committee resigned, 100 borrowers defaulted as a result. Thus, the delegated task of putting 
pressure on borrowers does not always work, as the substitution of physical collateral by 
social collateral leads to a delegation problem in which the lender must concern itself with 
whether or not the third party charged with imposing social sanctions will actually carry out 
this task (Bond and Rai 2002). 
In summary, physical collateral works solely through the psychological pressure it exerts. The 
social collateral of joint liability groups does not work at all. The only form of collateral that 
seems to work is social collateral in the form of pressure exerted by local authorities and in 
the form of denial of future credit in the event of default. However, it remains questionable 
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how long this pressure can be maintained. Anecdotal evidence from the World Bank (2003, 
2004b) suggests that in poor communes 70% of households default in their installment 
payments to VBSP, while around 30% default in their payments to VBARD.  
3.2  Effective formal credit demand15 
In total, 56% of all households in the sample (total N=251) have had an effective demand for 
formal credit (Figure 2). This clearly demonstrates the enormous breadth of outreach of the 
formal financial sector in Vietnam. Only a mere 16% of households are involved in the 
informal market and 23% of the total loans in this sample are borrowed in the informal sector. 
Duong and Izumida (2002) found that in their survey an even lower number, namely 17% of 
all loans, were extended by informal sources, and the World Bank (2003) states that the 
majority of households have access to formal credit in one way or another. These figures 
stand in contrast to the observations made in many other developing countries, where the 
informal sector is still the biggest supplier of financial services. As one important factor for 
the reduction of the informal sector from about 80% in the early 1990s to around 20% today, 
McCarty (2001) mentioned ‘crowding out’ by the VBARD and VBP, both of which have 
extended their outreach enormously in recent years. Nevertheless, the VBP has done this at 
the cost of financial sustainability. On the one hand, crowding out moneylenders who charge 
usury interest rates is a very welcome effect. However, not all moneylenders charge usury 
interest rates. So, crowding out the informal sector can have very negative effects by 
destroying informal financial networks without replacing them with a sustainable formal 
alternative. In Vietnam these informal structures have been replaced by formal ones, but the 
questions remains: are they sustainable in the long run? The VBP was recently replaced by 
the VBSP, which will continue the policy of the VBP. It is just a matter of time when the 
VBSP will become unsustainable, as its interest policy cannot cover its costs. Diagne et al. 
(2000) state that policies and financial institutions should be designed to complement the 
informal market rather then to replace it. 
Over 40% of households are not engaged in the formal financial sector. Zeller and Sharma 
(1998) state that some rural households simply do not apply for a loan because of the 
expectation that they will be turned down. This statement was supported by the work of 
Buchenrieder and Theesfeld (2001) in a similar research setting in Northern Vietnam. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 The VBSP, the successor of the VBP, will continue to provide physical collateral-free loans to certain target 
groups (Vietnam Economy 2003). 
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empirical results of their research showed that a lack of bankability from the perspective of 
the clients exists. This may foster the assumption that there is still a need to extend the credit 
outreach of the formal financial sector still further. Looking at Figure 3, it becomes evident 
that this figure must be reassessed. A mere 16% of the households in the sample are access-
constrained. When farmers were asked directly why they do not borrow in the formal sector, 
three answers were given most frequently: 1. afraid of debt; 2. have no collateral; 3. lack of 
knowledge. While ‘lack of knowledge’ clearly refers to a lack of human capital and ‘no 
collateral’ to a lack of physical capital, ‘afraid of debts’ refers to a mixture of human, 
physical, and social capital, namely a deficit in the risk-bearing capacity of a household. 
 
 Figure 2 Percentage of households 
using different credit sectors 
Figure 3 Access-constrained households 
(formal financial sector) 
Formal
48%
Informal
8%
No credit
36%
Formal 
and 
informal
8%
 
Access 
56%
No credit 
demand*
28%
Access 
constrained
16%
 
Source: Own figure 
Note: N=251 
Source: Own figure 
Note: N=251 
 *Households with no credit demand but access 
to the formal financial sector.  
 
The great success of formal credit outreach in Vietnam is clearly due to credit-delivering 
technologies that reach out far into the rural area, e.g. offering group loans at the local level, 
but also due to the strong promotion of credit by the government. Finally, the very low 
interest rates, which are highly subsidized, are increasing effective demand and thus outreach.  
Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 show that the market segments of the informal and formal 
credit markets are clearly separated in terms of interest rate, loan term, and loan amount. The 
informal market is separated into two different segments, first a ‘no interest rate’ segment and 
second a ‘high interest rate’ segment.16 Within the first segment, small amounts of money are 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Formal credit is defined as credit from the formal and semi-formal financial institutes, VBARD, VBP, and the 
State Treasury. However, as the State Treasury disbursed only few credits, it is excluded in the later analysis. 
16 However, some households are paying an interest rate in the informal sector that exactly matches the formal 
rate. Usually these households have a close friend or a relative who borrowed in the formal sector and passed on 
part of the loan to a friend, who is then charged the formal interest rate.  
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lent out to family members or friends at zero interest. These credits are usually used for 
consumption and are one method of coping with emergencies or an unexpected shortage of 
cash. The second segment is served by traditional moneylenders. They charge interest rates 
clearly above the rates of the formal sector (about three to four times as much). While loans 
from the moneylender are usually very short-term, loans from family members or friends are 
either short-term or open-ended. Households using moneylenders have either fallen through 
the informal safety net or they have to borrow more than their social network can provide, e.g. 
in the event of expensive surgery needed by a family member. The biggest share of formal 
loans is usually used for investment or productive purposes.
17
 
 
Figure 4 Interest rates per month of formal and informal credits 
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Figure 5 Formal and informal credit terms 
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17 After financial reforms at the beginning of the nineties, the real interest rate became positive in 1992 
(Senanayake and Ho 2001). Since then, however, the real interest rates have been gradually fallen (Dufhues et al. 
2004a).  
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Formal and informal credits are imperfect substitutes for each other. In particular, formal 
credit reduces, but does not completely eliminate, informal borrowing (Diagne 1999). Neither 
of the informal segments, the ‘no interest’ or the ‘high interest’ segment, can be reached by 
traditional credit products, and it would be probably a drain of public recourses if the 
Vietnamese government tried to do so. But the two segments could probably be reached by 
financial products other than credit. For instance, the lower segment could be served by 
client-adapted savings products, and the moneylender segment by a functioning social 
security system. 
 
Figure 6 Loan size of formal and informal credits in VND millions  
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Source: Own figure 
Note: 1 million VND = 70 US$ at time of survey (average conversion rate) 
 
3.3  Credit outreach 
The poverty outreach of the formal lenders is analyzed using a poverty index calculated with 
the PCA. Households that have no effective credit demand in the formal financial sector are 
the reference group. These households were first ranked according to their poverty index and 
then sorted into five groups of equal size. The lowest quintile incorporates the poorest 
households and the upper quintile embraces the better-off families. When assessing the 
poverty outreach of microfinance institutes at the household level, only new clients should be 
included in the analysis in order to rule out any impact that could have occurred due to the 
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financial services obtained from the lender and that could have led to a change in the poverty 
status of the client (Matin et al. 1999).18  
When looking at new clients of the formal financial sector, it is clear that better-off 
households are over-represented and that the poor and poorest households are under-
represented (Table 3). Nevertheless, clients are considered, only the poorest group is under-
represented. This might indicate a shift by formal lenders towards the better-off households.19 
Of course this is a rather naïve comparison, as any impact of the program is neglected. But 
assuming that there is no impact, the comparison would hold, and if a positive impact is 
assumed, the gap would in fact widen. Only in the case of a negative impact would the gap 
decrease. Discussions with farmers did not reveal any wide-scale negative credit impacts. 
Thus, the last option is unlikely to be realistic. Hence, it is likely that there is a shift towards 
the better-off clientele. Whether this shift is actively influenced by formal lenders, or rather 
passively, as all creditworthy poor households are already clients, remains unanswered.  
 
Table 3 Depth of outreach of formal lender clients 
 ← increasingly poor/increasingly rich → 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
No clients, reference group (N=111) 20% 20% 20% 20% 21%** 
Effective access (new clients) (N=40) 0% 13% 28% 40% 20% 
Effective access (all)* (N=140) 5% 24% 22% 26% 23% 
VBP clients (N=94) 4% 30% 23% 27% 16% 
VBARD clients (N=35) 6% 9% 26% 23% 37% 
Source: Own data 
Note: *Including VBP, VBARD, and State Treasury clients. 
 **Because of rounding, the figures may not add up to 100%. 
 
When looking at Table 4, it is clear that the poorest group (namely group 1) is clearly less 
often served by formal credit than the other groups. Only 24% of the households belonging to 
the poorest group have a formal loan. Surprisingly, the other poverty groups are more or less 
equally served. The VBP uses a targeting system which focuses on the poor but excludes the 
poorest, and the VBARD focuses on non-poor households (Dufhues et al. 2002). However, if 
the poorest have collateral in the form of land use certificates they can usually access credits 
                                                 
18 Henry et al. (2003) suggest using only clients who received a loan within the past three months. However, 
most of the loans in this sample are invested in livestock production – mainly pigs, cattle or buffaloes (Dufhues 
et al. 2004b). Initial profits are not expected within the first six to seven months. Thus, it is safe to consider 
clients who received a loan within the last seven months as unbiased by poverty impacts of the loan. These 
households are grouped in Table 3 as ‘new clients’. 
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from the VBP and VBARD (see Section 3.1). Nevertheless, the poorest households in this 
survey seem to have difficulty accessing formal bank loans in comparison to wealthier 
households, which corresponds to international experience (see Section 1). On the one hand, 
as stated by MOLISA and UNDP (2004), bank staff and local authorities fear that the poorest 
will fail to pay back their loans. On the other hand, many of the poorest households may 
simply not demand the credit products on offer. The most realistic scenario is probably a 
mixture of low creditworthiness and low demand, a scenario also supported by research in 
other developing countries. For instance, Navajas et al. (2000) state that in Bolivia the poorest 
households are less likely to be assessed as creditworthy and/or to demand loans of the type 
offered by the industry. 
 
Table 4 Outreach of formal credit by poverty group 
 ← increasingly poor/increasingly rich → 
 Group 1 
(N=29) 
Group 2 
(N=56) 
Group 3 
(N=53) 
Group 4 
(N=58) 
Group 5 
(N=55) 
Households with access per group 24% 61% 58% 62% 58% 
Source: Own data 
 
The two banks, the VBP and VBARD, serve clearly under-proportionately the poorest group 
of the sample population (Table 3). This finding is also confirmed by Izumida (2003), who 
states that the so-called ‘hungry’ households have rarely been reached by the VBP. However, 
in line with their different target groups, both have a different depth of poverty outreach. If 
one considers the two lower quintiles as fairly poor and the three upper quintiles as fairly rich, 
then almost 40% of all poor households in the sample were reached with credit by the VPB. 
This is also confirmed by the World Bank (2004a), which states that the VBP has been fairly 
successful in reaching the poor. Fairly may be interpreted as a noticeable outreach to the poor, 
although it is still an under-proportionate outreach. However, the aim of being a ‘Bank for the 
Poor’ is obviously not being achieved, as two-thirds of the VBP’s clients in this sample are 
not considered poor.20 Another way of measuring depth of outreach is the loan amount and 
loan term. Smaller amounts or shorter loan terms usually mean greater depth (Charitonenko et 
al. 2004, Schreiner 2002). Considering only the loan term, one might think that the VBARD 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 Almost three-quarters of the new loans were made by the VBP. Thus, a targeting bias through VBARD, which 
focuses more on the better-off clientele, can be excluded. 
20 Official data on this issue are much more optimistic. For instance MOLISA and UNDP (2004) state that three-
quarters of the subsidized loans are delivered to poor households. 
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has deeper outreach, with an average loan term of 2.5 years compared to 2.9 years in the case 
of the VBP. Nevertheless, there are two facts that contradict this. First, the interest rate is 
higher in the case of VBARD loans. As a result, farmers probably try to keep the loan term as 
short as possible, and second, the loan terms are more negotiable in the case of VBARD loans 
(Figure 7 and Figure 8). The VBP loans are ‘one-size-fits-all’ loans. Furthermore, VBP loans 
are clearly smaller than VBARD loans, suggesting that VBP has a higher depth of outreach 
than VBARD. The average loan amount of a VBP loan is 2.8 million VND (177 US$) per 
credit group member compared to 6.6 million VND (420 US$) from VBARD. Nevertheless, 
Christen et al. (1995) point out that scale determines whether significant outreach to the poor 
can be achieved. The VBP not only has greater depth of outreach, but also greater breadth. 
Two-thirds of all loans in this sample are disbursed by the VBP and only one-quarter by the 
VBARD.21 Thus, considering only Northern Vietnam, the VBP reaches deeper into the poorer 
part of the population than the VBARD. 
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3.4  Credit-constrained households 
Of the 260 households interviewed, nine households were dropped prior to the analysis and 
eleven were excluded during the analysis due to missing values. Thus, the parameters are 
estimated on the basis of 240 households. A binary logit model is used, where the dependent 
variable is one for all households with access to formal credit and zero otherwise. The 
                                                 
21 However, when considering national data the VBARD has a much bigger breadth of outreach then the VBP. 
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dependent variable is derived following the decision tree in the annex Figure 9. The list of 
regressors is presented in the earlier section (see Table 1 in section 2.2). From 23 potentially 
influential parameters, eight variables have a significant influence in the model presented. 
These variables are displayed in Table 5. The model predicted 92% of all observations 
correctly (Table 6). In the group of access-constrained households, the percentage of correctly 
predicted cases was good, at 71%; it was very good, at 96%, in the group of households with 
access to the formal financial market. The overall fit of the model is satisfactory, with a 
Nagelkerke R2 of 0.619. The correlation tables showed no problems due to multicollinearity 
between independent variables.  
Table 5 Parameters influencing households’ access to formal credit - binary logit 
estimation 
 Standard 
error 
Significance Exp(B) 
odds ratio 
Physical capital-related variables 
1. Red or Green Books (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.229 0.049 1.570 
2. Agricultural land (m2) 0.506 0.247 1.798 
3. Value of houses (VND) 1.119 0.051 8.919 
4. Government salary (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.390 0.438 0.739 
5. Cash savings (VND) 1.720 0.686 2.005 
Human capital-related variables 
6. School years of HH head (years) 0.415 0.419 1.399 
7. Vietnamese communication 
skills of the married couple 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.824 0.954 1.048 
8. Receiving agricultural extension (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.284 0.230 1.407 
9. Active household members (numbers) 0.310 0.321 0.735 
10. Share of non-farm activities in 
total yearly income 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.354 0.623 0.840 
11. Lost working days (days/year/HH) 0.482 0.823 0.898 
Social capital-related variables 
12. Giving help (days/year/HH) 0.348 0.703 1.142 
13. Receiving help (days/year/HH) 0.261 0.023 0.553 
14. Interest-free informal credit (VND) 0.597 0.100 0.374 
15. Thai/Tay village (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.770 0.004 9.007 
16. Market visits only by females (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.304 0.018 0.488 
17. Age of the household (years) 0.287 0.622 0.868 
Infrastructure-related variables 
18. Remoteness (km) 0.393 0.006 2.916 
19. Market visits per month (numbers) 0.868 0.041 5.897 
20. Different market visited (numbers) 0.416 0.233 1.642 
Poverty-related variables 
21. Poverty index (index) 0.462 0.553 1.315 
22. Day labor (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.331 0.353 0.735 
23. Receiving aid form government (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.239 0.858 0.958 
Chi-square 107.309 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.619 
Observations in model 240 
Source: Own data 
Note: Variables over a significance level of 0.1 are considered to be not significant. 
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Table 6 Classification of correctly predicted access to formal credit-constrained 
households 
 Predicted 
Observed 0 1 
Percent correct 
0 27 11 71.1 
1 8 194 96.0 
Overall percent correctly predicted   92.1 
Source: Own data  
Note: The categories of the dependent variable are: 0 = No access to formal credit; 1 = Access to formal 
credit. 
 
Physical capital: In contrast to other countries, lack of physical capital in the form of 
farmland is not a significant access constraint.22 However, the possession of land use 
certificates is significant, but the influence is the lowest of all significant variables. In the 
1990s, one of the most important access constraints to formal rural credit in Vietnam was the 
lack of physical collateral in form of land use certificates (Hung and Giap 1999). Today, land 
use certificates seem to have lost most of this influence. The ongoing dissemination of 
‘Red/Green Books’ in recent years has brought an increasing number of households into 
possession of assets that are useable as collateral, and this has broadened the possible 
outreach dramatically (Dufhues et al. 2004a, McCarty 2001).23 Moreover, the main supplier 
of formal loans in the research area is the VBP, which tries to rely totally on social collateral 
(section 3.1 and 3.3). This explains the fact that possession of land use certificates appears to 
have little influence on access to formal credit. Nevertheless, households without certificates 
may still have difficulties in accessing formal loans, particularly from the VBARD.24 
A high-value home has much greater influence on the likelihood of obtaining access to formal 
credit than land use certificates. Housing is probably used as a visible indicator of the general 
wealth of the household and can easily be assessed by local officials or credit officers. 
Furthermore, houses can be used as formal collateral.25 This may explain the considerable 
influence of the value of housing on the likelihood of obtaining access to formal credit. The 
visible wealth of a household seems to be very important for its access to credit.26  
                                                 
22 For instance, Sarap (1990) found that the smaller size of land holdings in India has an adverse effect on the 
access of small farmers to formal credit institutions. 
23 In this sample, 89% of the households have a Red Book and/or a Green Book. 
24 Lack of collateral was also mentioned by access-constrained households as a reason for self-exclusion. 
25 However, in this sample only one case was found where the house was used as collateral for a VBARD loan. 
26 The housing status of a household must not be equated with its poverty status. Geppert and Dufhues (2003) 
and Simanowitz (2000) stated that the appearance of housing is an insufficient indicator for poverty, for instance 
housing could be completely debt-financed. 
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Human capital: None of the human capital-related variables is significant. Particularly 
surprising is the fact that the variable ‘school years of HH-head’ is not significant, as research 
from other developing countries, e.g. Evans et al. (1999), Sarap (1990), and Vaessen (2001), 
support the opposite notion. Moreover, illiteracy levels in Vietnam remain high among the 
poor ethnic minorities, and in more remote parts of the country, especially in the northern 
mountains (Bhushan et al. 2001). This may indicate that the formal credit application process 
is not in itself a market entry barrier any more to poorly educated customers. Group credits 
from the VBP have probably eradicated this access constraint. Within the group credit 
scheme, only the credit group leader who submits the credit proposal needs a certain degree of 
literacy (Dufhues et al. 2002). Furthermore, investments are not usually very innovative and 
revolve mostly around conventional enterprises in animal production. Thus, a high amount of 
human capital does not seem necessary to carry out those investments. 
Social capital: Dwelling in a Thai/Tay village has the highest influence on the likelihood of 
having access to formal credit. As mentioned above, from a national point of view Tay and 
Thai are ethnic minorities. However, in the two research areas these minorities represent the 
majority and occupy many key positions in the local administration, including the district 
bank branches. It is not surprising, therefore, that inhabitants of non-Thai/Tay villages have a 
significantly higher chance of being access-constrained then the ethnic majority in Ba Be and 
Yen Chau respectively. However, privileged access to credit may be related not only to 
ethnicity, but also to the fact that the predominant farming system in these villages is paddy 
rice production. Paddy rice production was for long time seen by local officials and bank staff 
as a farming system with a high developmental priority. Thus, inhabitants of these villages 
were likely to obtain easier access to formal credit. Moreover, these villages usually have a 
better market connection and are thus more easily accessed by bank staff, which also 
promotes access to loans. 
The numbers of days of informal help and the amount of interest-free informal loans that a 
household receives from its social network may both be indicators of a functioning social 
network, but they may also lower the chance of gaining access to formal credit. A functioning 
informal social network has apparently no positive influence on the likelihood of obtaining 
access to formal credit. But high use of the social network is obviously a strong indicator of 
an income shock or a shock that negatively influences the repaying capacity of the 
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household.27 The incidence of shocks either raises the chance of being assessed by local 
authorities as not creditworthy or adds to the self-exclusion tendency of households.  
In households where only female persons go to the market (i.e. the wife of the household head 
or a female household head), the chance of being access-constrained is higher then in other 
households. On the one hand, this may be caused by a lack of human capital, as the male 
household head is mentally or physically unable to go to the market. While the number of 
missed working days due to illness is not significant, the permanent absence of an important 
member of the workforce such as the male household head may be more important. 
Moreover, the absence of the male household head can be easily observed by local authorities 
or bank staff and may indicate a problem inside the household, which may lower its 
creditworthiness. On the other hand, women probably have less access to official information 
networks than men.28 Households of low social standing are often excluded from information 
networks and thus lack important information. Vaessen (2001) draws similar conclusions 
from a research study in Nicaragua. One reason mentioned by households that are access-
constrained to formal credit is lack of information. 
Infrastructure: Surprisingly, the variable ‘distance to the district capital with the nearest bank 
branch’ is positive. Former research in Vietnam, e.g. by Hung and Giap (1999), has shown 
that remoteness is an access constraint to formal credit. Nevertheless, many programs around 
the world are set up specifically to serve the under-served. They locate where financial 
services have long been weak (Morduch 1999). In the case of Vietnam, those areas are/were 
certainly the more remote areas. Through the VBP and special credit programs, the 
Vietnamese government has pushed credit outreach for poverty reduction in favor of remote 
communes. Minot (2000) states that poverty is more pronounced in places that are more 
remote from markets and cities. Obviously program placement is not random, and remoter 
villages or communes with a higher share of poverty are preferred. However, Alther et al. 
(2002) state that the poorest villages may not necessarily be located inside the poorest 
communes. Poor villages in wealthier areas may have less access to government services.  
The variable with the third highest influence is ‘frequency of market visits’. The high 
influence in this case may be explained by the lack of information about credit application 
procedures and availability in the village, as described in Dufhues et al. (2002). Farmers use 
                                                 
27 The use of informal borrowing may also be seen as an indicator of poverty. However, other research, e.g. by 
Ruthven (2001), has shown that reciprocal lending is not necessarily related to poverty.  
28 McCarty (2001) points out that the vast majority of rural loans are given to men.  
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market days not only for buying and selling, but also for exchanging information and keeping 
relations and networks alive. Dufhues et al. (2002) also showed that good relations with 
commune officials or the credit officer are essential for receiving credit. These contacts are 
most likely to be established and maintained on market days. This finding is supported by 
Vaessen (2001), who found that access to certain information and networks in Nicaragua is 
essential for receiving credit. The more often a household goes to the market, the more 
investment ideas the household may develop. Consequently, the bigger its demand for credit 
and the lower its self-exclusion tendency is likely to be.  
Poverty:29 A very surprising result is that the poverty variable does not have a significant 
influence on the chance of a household being access-constrained. For instance, former 
research by Duong and Izumida (2002) concluded that the poor have great difficulty in 
accessing formal credits. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics in section 2.2 indicate that 
particularly the poorest households tend be excluded. On the one hand, this may be explained 
by the fact that the Vietnamese government has made major efforts to increase the supply of 
formal credits to the rural poor, and clearly these efforts have been successful. On the other 
hand, the poorest households may potentially be able to obtain access to formal credit, but 
they do not demand it as their investment possibilities are very limited, their debt-taking 
capacity is low and their risk-aversion is high.
30
  
4 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This research paper has contributed to enhance our understanding of the broad outreach of 
formal rural lenders in Northern Vietnam. Compared to a decade ago, the informal market 
                                                 
29 Better access to credit potentially reduces the incidence of rural poverty via a positive impact of the credit 
itself and, in the case of not borrowing, via access to consumption loans at times of income shocks. Therefore, 
poverty is endogenous to credit access and the inclusion of a poverty index would result in biased coefficients. 
However, in this case study, endogenity of poverty is expected to be negligible for two reasons: first, in the past, 
formal Vietnamese lenders did not disburse consumption loans. Second, Quach et al. (2003, 2004) found in their 
studies only a very small impact of formal credit on household welfare in Vietnam. As mentioned in Section 3.3, 
households who received a formal loan within the last seven months are likely to be unbiased by poverty impacts 
of the loan. Therefore, a new model was calculated with a sub-sample of households. In this sub-sample, 
households that had a formal loan with duration of more than seven months were excluded. The results from this 
model also indicate that poverty status had no influence on the likelihood of a household being access-
constrained to formal credit.  
30 First the poverty index variable was squared and then multiplied by its original value, which can also be 
negative, to give a higher weight to the extreme cases. Second a dummy variable for the lowest quintile of the 
poverty index was incorporated in the regression instead of the poverty index itself to give a higher weight to the 
poorest households. But, in both cases the poverty variable turned out to be not significant. However, when 
dropping all variables except the poverty index as explanatory variable, this variable becomes significant. This 
indicates that poverty does play a role but its single dimensions or characteristics which are already reflected by 
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now plays only a minor role. The poverty outreach of the formal rural lenders is satisfactory 
(e.g. about 50% of the households belonging to the two lower poverty quintiles have effective 
credit demand). However, the outreach analysis has shown that the poorest households are 
seldom clients of formal lenders. Only slightly more than 20% of the poorest households are 
served by formal lenders, while among the wealthiest quintile this proportion is around 60%. 
When considering access to formal credit, this figure must be re-evaluated. As the logit 
analysis revealed, general poverty (as captured with the poverty index) does not significantly 
influence access to formal credit. The results indicate that only certain aspects of poverty, e.g. 
low quality of housing, have an important influence on access to formal credit in Vietnam. 
Thus, the poorest households use formal credit less often, but are not significantly more often 
access-constrained. This means that the poorest households simply have much less demand 
for the types of formal credit products on offer. Improving credit products or offering new 
credit lines would only slightly improve the credit coverage of poorer households. A more 
promising approach would be to introduce a specialized pro-poor extension service to widen 
the scope of their investment ideas and opportunities, combined with a general improvement 
in the infrastructure. One factor that very positively influenced access to formal credit was the 
connection to the market. A good market connection serves credit outreach in a twofold 
manner: first, households have better access to credit-relevant information; and second, 
through better market access they may find new investment opportunities. The most 
appropriate tool to incorporate poorer households into the formal financial system would the 
mobilization of savings. As stated by several scholars, all people can save, even the poorest of 
the poor, and therefore deposit services have deeper outreach than credit (Charitonenko et al. 
2004, Schreiner 2002, Zeller and Sharma 2000). Moreover, Dufhues et al. (2004a) revealed an 
enormous and unmet demand for formal savings among the rural population in Northern 
Vietnam.  
Nevertheless, the number of access-constrained households is surprisingly low. One reason 
for the low number is the weakening or eradication of former access constraints. A major 
access constraint in the last decade was lack of collateral. Land use certificates are nowadays 
widespread and they have only limited influence on access to formal credit. If the process of 
issuing land use certificates is finally completed and/or if the VBARD and the VBSP enforce 
their national policy of granting collateral-free loans, the number of households without 
                                                                                                                                                        
other variables in the model turn out to be more important. As mentioned above the correlation table did not 
reveal any problematic correlations between the independent variables.  
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access to the formal financial market due to lack of land use certificates will dwindle, and the 
importance of land use certificates as physical collateral will become even less important. 
Other access constraints, namely remoteness (distance to the nearest bank branch) and literacy 
requirements of the household head, have been eradicated through locally disbursed group 
credits. However, considering the anecdotal reports of very low repayment rates, the price of 
eradicating these access constraints has likely been a decrease in sustainability of the formal 
lenders. As Von Pischke (1991:83) points out:  
“Binding financial constraints to the formal sector are not necessarily anti-
developmental. If they stand in the way of bad investment, they are socially beneficial. 
For the financial system to make good loans and allocate funds for high-return 
investments, it must reject poor proposals, unfit applicants, and low-return investments. 
To generate good loans requires a highly selective screening of applicants.” 
Nevertheless, some barriers to access continue to exist. To reduce these access barriers, 
locally-oriented rather than general actions should be taken, catering to the needs and the 
circumstances of those households which lack access, particularly ethnic minorities and 
female-led households. Such measures will be particularly useful within the organizational 
structure of the lenders themselves. Dufhues et al. (2002), for example, suggested employing 
ethnic minority credit officers, which would create more awareness of those groups inside the 
institution. Furthermore, special female credit officers for female-headed households could 
work in the same direction. However, the recent efforts of the Vietnamese government, for 
instance the establishment of the VBSP, represent an attempt to broaden access in general. 
But this increase in outreach will go hand in hand with an increase in access to credit for non-
creditworthy households, thus resulting in decreased repayment rates. Moreover, it is 
questionable whether households that do not have access today, or do not demand the existing 
products, will demand credits from the VBSP. If rural lenders in Vietnam were one day 
forced to work in a competitive environment according to market principles, there would be a 
great chance that large parts of the population would be access-constrained as a result of 
previous loan defaults.  
Whether the breadth and depth of formal credit outreach that was financed by enormous 
government subsidies contributes to poverty reduction, however, remains a subject for future 
research. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the conclusions drawn in this paper are 
based on a rather small and regionally limited sample. Therefore, further confirmation of the 
results by a larger and more representative study would be desirable.  
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Annex 
  
Table 7 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the binary logistic 
regression model on credit access 
Variable name Unit Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
1. Red or Green Books (yes/no) 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.32 
2. Agricultural land (1000 m2) 0.00 65.00 9.51 7.82 
3. Value of houses  (Mill. VND) 0.00 130.00 10.11 12.92 
4. Government salary (yes/no) 0.0.0 1.00 0.13 0.33 
5. Cash savings (Mill. VND) 0.0.0 55.00 1.48 5.57 
6. School years of HH head (years) 0.0.0 14.00 5.20 3.02 
7. Vietnamese 
communication skills of 
the married couple 
(yes/no) 0.0.0 1.00 0.83 0.38 
8. Receiving agricultural 
extension service 
(yes/no) 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.39 
9. Active HH members  (numbers) 0.50* 7.00 2.83 1.26 
10. Share of non-farm 
activities in total yearly 
income  
(%) 0.00 100.00 15.17 21.51 
11. Lost working days due to 
illness per year/HH 
(days) 0.00 509.00 42.46 58.29 
12. Giving help per year/HH (days) 0.00 200.00 36.26 30.75 
13. Receiving help per 
year/HH 
(days) 0.00 300.00 25.76 36.96 
14. Interest-free informal 
credit 
(Mill. VND) 0.00 18.00 0.18 1.36 
15. Thai/Tay village (yes/no) 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 
16. Market visits only by 
female HH members 
(yes/no) 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 
17. Age of the household  (years) 1.00 81.00 19.66 14.14 
18. Remoteness (km) 1.50 24.00 10.48 7.47 
19. Market visits per month (numbers) 0.00 30.00 5.63 6.46 
20. Different markets visited (numbers) 0.00 5.00 1.13 0.47 
21. Poverty index   -1.82 3.09 0.00 1.00 
22. Supply of day labor (yes/no) 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.48 
23. Receiving aid from 
government 
(yes/no) 0.00 1.00 8.76 0.28  
Source: Own data 
Note:  *Households containing only persons over the retirement age were counted as having 0.5 workforces. 
  HH = household 
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Figure 9 Decision tree of the effective credit demand in the formal sector 
Credit application:
yes/no?
(N = 251)
Received full credit:
yes/no
(N = 151; 60 %)
No demand
(N = 70; 28%)
Access problems
(N = 28; 11%)
No credit demand
(N = 70; 28 %)
No access to credit
(N = 41; 16%)
No Yes
YesNo
Credit refused
(N =13; 5 %) 
Credit rationed1
restricted access
Access to credit
(N = 140; 56%)
•No investment needs
•Sufficient capital
•Too complicated
•Lack of knowledge
•No collateral
•Credit conditions
•Bribes
•Afraid of debts
•Do not know why
•Loan funds exhausted
•No/not enough collateral
Source: Adapted from Barham et al. (1996) and Heidhues and Schrieder (1998)  
Note: 1Credit-rationed households do have access to the formal financial system and are therefore not 
separated in the analysis. Besides, in one research area (Ba Be) not a single household was rationed. 
Nine households were excluded from the sample because of missing values. This decision tree 
includes the formal and semi-formal financial institutes, VBARD, VBP, and the State Treasury. 
 
Figure 10 Principal Component Indicators 
Ten indicators were chosen for the PCA, including the benchmark indicator, three asset-related variables, one 
food-related variable, two dwelling-related variables and three indicators related to human resources. The 
poverty component is given by: 
PC1 = 0.587 * per person expenditure on clothes and footwear 
 + 0.674 * total value of assets per person 
 + 0.662 * value of electronics and appliances per household (HH) 
 + 0.596 * value of transportation-related assets per HH 
 − 0.497 * months without enough to eat per year 
 + 0.531 * type of roof 
 + 0.566 * electricity supply 
 + 0.675 * percentage of adults with only primary education 
 + 0.592 * percentage of adults with college education 
 + 0.542 * percentage of literate adults 
This equation accounts for 35.4% of the total variance of the original data. 
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